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Abstract: The growing dominance of equity holdings by institutional investors, both domestic and 
international, is casting a sharp focus on their activities and owners and monitors of firms. It is 
suggested that whereas some general considerations arise in all cases, it is useful to separate discussion 
of the developments in the Anglo Saxon countries and continental Europe/Japan. The former is 
showing an increase in direct influence of institutions in place of the previous reliance on the takeover 
mechanism to discipline managers. This has arguably led to improved corporate performance. The 
latter remain more firmly in the bank-relationship based governance paradigm. On the other hand, such 
differences should not be exaggerated, and some convergence is discernible on a modified form of the 
Anglo Saxon paradigm where institutions are the primary actors in corporate governance generally. In 
Europe, EMU will provide a major spur to such convergence. 
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Introduction 
 
The development of institutional investors, and their growing dominance as owners of corporations has 
had a pervasive influence on corporate governance. The basic issue is simply stated. Given the divorce 
of ownership and control in the modern corporation, principal-agent problems arise, as shareholders 
cannot perfectly control managers acting on their behalf. Managers, who have superior information 
about the firm and its prospects and at most a partial link of their compensation to the firms' 
profitability2, may divert funds in various ways away from those who sink equity capital in the firm, 
notably expropriation3 or diversion to unattractive projects from a shareholder's point of view.  
 
This article first examines the relation between growth of institutions and equity finance, which is the 
basis of corporate governance. Some general considerations and models of corporate governance are 
then outlined. The article then successively examines the themes arising from corporate governance in 
the Anglo Saxon countries and in Continental Europe. 
 
1 Institutional investors and the growth of securities markets  
 
Underlying the issue of corporate governance by institutional investors are changes in financing 
patterns which have led to a rise in the importance of securities market finance for enterprises, and 
therein, a growth in influence of institutions. A view of developments in financial structure over time is 
shown in Tables 1-4 for the G-74 countries. The tables show data for end-1997, drawn from National 
Flow of Funds Balance Sheets, and comparative data for 1980. 
 
Table 1 shows that the volume 5 of financial claims relative to GDP has grown sharply in all of the G-7, 
albeit varying in terms of levels. This has coincided in most cases with an increase in financial 
intermediation - the proportion of claims held indirectly in banks or institutional investors as opposed to 
being held directly. In other words, the growth of financial markets has not led to a fall in 
intermediation, indeed quite the contrary. But the locus is changing - of the intermediated claims, a 
growing proportion has been in the form of institutional investment (including life insurance, mutual 
funds and pension funds). It is noteworthy that this tendency is apparent across all countries shown and 
not just the so-called Anglo-Saxon ones, although differences in levels are still marked.  
                                              
2 Performa nce related pay, the use of share options and similar devices may help to align managers' and 
shareholders' interests. But such contracts may themselves worsen the governance problem by leading to 
heightened incentives for self dealing, with managers negot iating such contracts when they know performance 
may improve. 
3 Beyond theft, transfer pricing and asset sales, expropriation may take forms such as perquisites, high 
salaries, diversion of funds to pet projects and general entrenchment even in cases when managers are no longer 
competent or qualified to run the firm. 
4  UK data exclude offshore bank loans and deposits (i.e. the eurocurrency market) 
5  The size indicator shows the total value of all financial assets of the conventional economic sectors in 
the System of National Accounts (household, corporate, banks, non-bank financial institutions, government, 
foreign).  
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These changes have coincided with in most cases a sharper rise in securities (i.e. bonds and equities) 
than in deposits and loans, implying that bank assets and liabilities have declined relative to the total 
(Table 2). Meanwhile, households have tended to shift the composition of their balance sheets to 
institutions and away from deposits as well as directly-held equities and bonds (Table 3), although again 
levels still differ. Patterns for companies are less clear, but there would appear to be a tendency for 
them to reduce their dependence on loans and increase their reliance on equities, as shown in Table 4 
(it being borne in mind that the balance sheet composition reflects capital gains as well as new 
issuance). The leverage of equity holders in corporate governance is hence potentially enhanced. On 
the other hand, in levels terms, the table still shows the expected difference between Anglo Saxon and 
other countries in terms of the importance of bank loans to companies, it being below 20% in the 
former and above it - at times well above - in the latter. Finally, use of corporate bonds is particularly 
low in all the EU countries shown – including the UK.  
 
We now go on to use the data on financial structure indicators for the G-7 countries shown in Tables 1-
4 to investigate further the potential effects of growth in institutionalisation on corporate finance and 
capital markets, as background to the discussion of institutions and corporate governance. The simple 
estimates shown utilise the data on financial structure indicators using 5 yearly observations over the 
period 1970-95 as a panel (pooled cross section and time series) dataset. An additional variable was 
monthly equity market volatility averaged over quinquennia. There are in effect 42 observations for 
each series, with 6 observations each for 7 countries. We then regressed various indicators of the size 
of the institutional sector on the indicators of financial structure. We used both of the standard panel 
data estimation techniques, namely testing for random and fixed effects. The latter being considered 
more appropriate, we only report results of this (while noting the random effects results are very 
similar). The work thus differs from otherwise-comparable work such as Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 
(1996), which estimated correlations on purely cross sectional data. It should be emphasised that the 
results will not have any causality implication, but rather show what patterns or changes in financial 
market structure and behaviour has accompanied institutionalisation. It cannot be ruled out that other 
causes have affected both dependent and independent variables (such as liberalisation generally and 
technological change). As the time series observations are not independent, “t” values will be 
overstated. Finally, the datasets are small so again conclusions must be drawn cautiously; outliers may 
have a disproportionate effect. More generally, further and more systematic investigation is needed. 
 
With these caveats in mind the results for the G-7 (Table 5) tend to indicate the following: higher levels 
of institutionalisation (measured by the share of total financial assets) accompanies a larger size of the 
financial superstructure (total financial assets/GDP), even when national differences in levels of the 
latter are taken into account by the dummies. Second, higher institutionalisation accompanies a higher 
share of equity in total financial assets, again potentially boosting corporate governance. Third, there is 
no significant link of the level of institutionalisation to volatility. Of course, average volatility may still be 
consistent with occasional, disruptive, peaks of volatility. 
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Concerning household sector portfolios, the share of institutional investment in households' portfolios 
appears to be negatively related to the share of deposits and bonds, suggesting some substitution. 
Looking finally at company liabilities, the share of institutional investment in total financial assets tends 
to accompany higher levels of the share of equities in corporate liabilities and lower levels of loans. 
Concerning bonds, the coefficient is insignificant. It is notable that strong substitution is indicated for 
both key elements of banks’ balance sheets, namely household deposits and company loans. The 
influence of banks via their traditional business is thus seen to decline while institutional leverage 
increases. 
 
We split the sample between the “Anglo Saxon countries” i.e. the UK, US and Canada (with 18 
observations) and “Continental Europe and Japan”, i.e. Germany, France, Italy and Japan (24 
observations) see Table 5. Were the results for the G-7 “driven” by only one group, bearing in mind 
that institutional growth has been much more marked in the Anglo Saxon countries. If so this raises the 
issue of whether the results are only applicable to a certain type of financial system. In fact, there are a 
number of results that appear consistently for both groups examined separately. In each case, the rise 
of institutions in total financial assets has accompanied a larger overall financial superstructure as 
shown by total financial assets/GDP; the growth of institutions’ share of household portfolios has 
accompanied a decline in deposits; and a higher level of institutional assets as a proportion of total 
assets has accompanied a higher level of corporate equity and a lower level of corporate loans. 
Interesting “idiosyncratic” results are that in the Anglo Saxon countries, a larger institutional sector is 
indeed associated with a lower level of capital market volatility; that there is strong substitution from 
equities and bonds to institutions in households’ portfolios in the Anglo  Saxon countries (i.e. 
“institutionalisation” of portfolios); and some evidence of higher bond shares in company liabilities in 
Continental Europe and Japan as institutions increase in size and importance. 
 
2 Broad themes in corporate governance  
 
In the context of the above information, which shows a growing predominance of equity finance and 
institutional holdings thereof, we now go on to discuss corporate governance in more detail. As noted in 
the introduction, given the divorce of ownership and control in the modern corporation, and imperfect 
control of managers, who have superior information about the firm and its prospects and at most a 
partial link of their compensation to the firms' profitability, agency costs may arise. Managers may 
divert funds in various ways away from those who sink equity capital in the firm, notably expropriation 
or diversion to unattractive projects from a shareholder's point of view.  
 
Evidence for such agency costs includes the frequent observation that share prices of bidder firms fall 
when acquisitions are announced (Roll 1986); resistance of managers to takeovers that threaten their 
positions (Walkling and Long 1984); and the premium offered to shares with voting rights (Zingales 
1995). Whereas it may be argued that desire of managers to maintain reputation in the market will help 
 5
to protect shareholders (Kreps 1990), it may not be sufficient to protect shareholders and ensure the 
viability of external financing. And although there is evidence that investors' overoptimism may play a 
role in pricing of external finance6, it is hardly a viable basis for provision of external finance. As noted 
by Schleifer and Vishny (1997), shareholders are much more vulnerable than other stakeholders in the 
firm, as for example workers and creditors can withdraw labour, debt finance etc. and apply pressure 
on the managers by that means. 
 
Principal-agent problems in equity finance imply a need for shareholders to exert control over 
management, while also remaining sufficiently distinct from managers to let them buy and sell shares 
freely without breaking insider trading rules. If difficulties of corporate governance are not resolved, 
these market failures in turn also have implications for corporate finance in that equity will be costly 
and often subject to quantitative restrictions 7.  
 
A key to all successful forms of corporate governance is mechanisms for legal protection of 
shareholders (e.g. of the right to vote on important corporate matters, notably mergers, as well as 
elections of boards of directors); it may be supported by a legally enforceable duty of loyalty by 
managers to shareholders (Schleifer and Vishny (1997)). In this context, in all models of governance, 
boards of directors, and in particular non-executive directors, act as shareholders' representatives in 
monitoring management and ensuring the firm is run in their interests. Shareholder influence is ensured 
by their right to vote on choice of directors (as well as other elements of policy proposed by 
management). On the other hand, boards, if weakly supervised, may well be captured by management 
and act in their interests rather than those of shareholders (Jensen 1993), or at least are passive in all 
but extreme circumstances (Kaplan 1994). 
 
Hence, effectiveness of corporate governa nce typically also requires presence of large investors, be 
they banks, other companies or institutional investors. They will have the leverage to oblige managers 
to distribute profits to providers of external finance. They are needed because individual investors may 
find it difficult to enforce their rights, even if they are legally enshrined, notably owing to difficulty of 
acting in a concerted manner against management as well as free rider problems which make it not 
worthwhile for an individual to collect information and monitor management. Conversely, large 
investors may find it easier to enforce their rights in court. (Note that this argument suggests that 
households will be justified in being more willing to provide equity finance via institutions than they 
would directly – as is indeed implied to be the case in the data shown in Section 1.)  
 
                                              
6 See for example evidence on the overvaluation of junk bonds used to finance US take-overs in the 1980s 
in Kaplan and Stein (1993) and of new equity issues by Ritter (1991). 
7 In practice, even in the Anglo Saxon countries, new equity is typically issued by established firms with 
good reputations in the markets and prospects for steady dividend growth; by firms being floated for the first 
time ; for high return/high risk ventures which cannot be wholly financed by debt; and to restructure the balance 
sheet of firms in `financial distress'. Finally, experience shows that - probably owing to the difficulties outlined 
above - equity markets are highly unreliable as a source of funds, being subject to cyclical "feasts and famines". 
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There is also a "downside" to large investors, as they may override the interests of minority 
shareholders. Consistent with this, Morck et al (1988) found that profitability is higher for firms with 
shareholders with up to 5% stakes, but beyond that, profitability falls. This may link to larger investors 
tending to use firms to generate private benefits of control that are not shared by minority shareholders. 
5% is precisely the type of maximum shareholding that institutional investors usually seek. 
 
There are well-known systemic contrasts between the behaviour of financial institutions and markets in 
the major OECD countries, notably as they relate to the financin g and governance of companies. The 
general division is between the "Anglo-Saxon" systems of the UK, US, Canada and Australia, together 
with the international capital markets (or "euromarkets"), on the one hand, and the systems which 
prevailed historically in Continental Europe and Japan (CEJ). We would characterise the traditional 
distinction between the two systems in terms of the finance and control of corporations as that between 
direct control via debt and market control via equity. (Davis 1995a). 
 
Direct control via debt implies relationship banking along the lines of the German or Japanese model. 
This typically involves companies forming relationships with a small number of creditors and equity 
holders. There is widespread cross shareholding among companies8. Banks are significant shareholders 
in their own right and in Germany are represented on supervisory boards both as equity holders and as 
creditors. It is the control rights offered to creditors by offering short term debt, as well as when firms 
default or violate debt contracts that arguably is most important. Nonetheless, banks in these countries 
have also been able to exert control through the voting rights conferred on them by custody of bearer 
shares of individual investors who have surrendered their proxies. Meanwhile, the influence of other 
(institutional) shareholders is often limited by voting restrictions, countervailing influence of corporate 
shareholders and lack of detailed financial information, as well as the right of other stakeholders 
(employees, suppliers, creditors) to representation on boards. Implicitly, monitoring of managers is 
delegated to a trusted intermediary - the bank. In practice, equity holders are often discriminated 
against in such systems, to the advantage of the creditors, e.g. in terms of dividends (Hoshi et al (1993) 
show how profitable Japanese firms sought to avoid the costs of bank links when access to public debt 
issuance was liberalised). Such discrimination may make minority investors unwilling to invest, which 
leaves equity markets themselves underdeveloped9. However, as noted below, institutions from the 
Anglo Saxon countries are beginning to fight back against such discrimination. 
 
Meanwhile, as regards market control via equity, the principal advantage of take-over activity is that it 
can partly resolve the conflict of interest between management and shareholders; those firms which 
deviate most extensively from shareholders' objectives - and which consequently tend to have lower 
market values as shareholders dispose of their holdings - have a greater likelihood of being acquired. 
And indeed there is evidence that takeovers act to address governance problems (Jensen 1993). The 
                                              
8 Although bidirectional crossholdings are typically means of cementing alliances or collusion rather than 
exerting control. 
9 Note that there is also evidence that banks may be inadequate as monitors, not seeking to discipline 
managers so long as the firm is far from default (Harris and Raviv 1990). 
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threat of take-over, as much as its manifestation, acts as a constraint on managerial behaviour. 
Institutional shareholders, both directly and via non-executive directors can have an important role to 
play in this context both in complementing take-over pressure as a monitoring constraint on 
management behaviour, and in evaluating take-over proposals when they arise. 
 
Research on the best form of corporate governance is inconclusive (Mayer 1996). The insider model of 
direct control via debt, with its emphasis on private information and on stakeholder relationships rather 
than public disclosure and liquidity, may be superior at implementing policies needing consensus among 
stakeholders, encouraging high levels of fixed investment by the firm and of the employees in firm 
specific skills, in the context of long lived corporations. On the other hand, the outsider models in which 
institutions play a greater role may be better at responding to change and building up new firms.  
 
As argued by Allen and Gale (1994), capital market financing could well be economically beneficial 
with emerging industrie s, with high financial and economic risks and where knowledge about industry is 
uncertain (IT, biotechnology). In contrast, banking may have a comparative advantage in industries 
where markets are mature and innovation and uncertainty are low, as banks can then accurately 
monitor and diversify risk among companies.10 
 
3 The Anglo Saxon countries; new paradigms of corporate governance  
 
The willingness of banks - and institutions, via junk bonds - to finance highly leveraged buyouts (LBOs) 
and take -overs in the 1980s in the UK and US brought to the fore a new form of control, market 
control via debt. A key source of conflict between managers and shareholders stems from firms' 
retention policies. Debt issue can ease tensions, since by increasing interest payments, the internal 
resources at managers' disposal are reduced, while the equity stakes that managers usually take on in 
LBOs increases their incentives to perform well. This forces them to incur the inspection of the capital 
markets either via debt issue or equity issue for each new project undertaken. Jensen (1986) argues 
that desire for improved corporate control by means of debt could have been an important motivation 
behind the wave of leveraged take-overs and buyouts in the 1980s. A disadvantage of increased 
gearing is that potential conflicts between shareholders and debt holders become more intense11. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that shareholders in highly-leveraged firms have an incentive to 
engage in projects that are too risky and so increase the possibility of bankruptcy. If the projects are 
unsuccessful, the limited liability provisions of equity contracts imply that creditors bear most of the 
                                              
10 It may be added that mature industries, unless in difficulty, may well generate sufficient internal funds to 
cover investme nt needs in any case. 
11 Perhaps more importantly, high leverage is likely to have various deleterious consequences. By raising 
the bankruptcy rate, it increases the incidence of dead weight bankruptcy costs arising from legal costs, diversion 
of managerial energies and break-up of unique bundles of assets, for example. And at a macro level increased 
corporate fragility is likely to magnify the multiplier in the case of recession (Davis (1995b)). 
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cost12. Given this risk, monitoring of managers by creditors may become so intense as to preclude 
investment altogether. Indeed, it is commonly argued that LBOs are a transient form of corporate 
organisation, which may be helpful in unwinding earlier excesses in terms of diversification etc.  
 
Institutions in countries such as the US have however, been increasingly disenchanted with take-overs 
and buyouts. As noted by Schleifer and Vishny (1997), takeovers are so expensive that only major 
performance failures are likely to be addressed; they may increase agency costs when bidding 
managers overpay for acquisitions that bring them private benefits of control; and they require a liquid 
capital market (e.g. for junk bond issuance) to provide finance. Also one may instance increasing use 
of take-over defences by managers of weak companies and/or greenmail payoffs of raiders, regardless 
of shareholders' interests; increased dissatisfaction with managerial compensation and performance 
under the protection of such devices; high costs in terms of fees to investment bankers etc. 
 
Combined with new regulations on US institutions allowing institutions to collaborate13 more readily, this 
discontent brought to the fore a 'corporate governance movement' based on direct control via equity14. 
The dominance of institutions as shareholders gives ample scope for leverage - they own 50% of the 
top 50 US companies, and the top 20 US pension funds own 8% of the stock of the ten largest 
companies. Such influence may be exerted via selection of boards of directors, as noted above. But 
these mechanism may be supplemented by direct links from institutional investors to management15 
either formally at annual meetings, or informally at other times. This is precisely what has been 
observed in recent years. 
 
A further important motivation has been development of indexing strategies, which force funds to hold 
shares in large companies as long as that policy is maintained, and thus encourage them, following their 
fiduciary duty as well as in the interests of returns, to improve management of underperformers to 
boost overall asset returns, see Monks  (1997)16.  Even active investors holding large stakes in a 
company must bear in mind the potentially sizeable cost of disposing of their share holdings, thus again 
encouraging activism; in effect, they are driven to seek direct control due to illiquidity (see Coffee 
1991). With growing institutionalisation it becomes much easier and cheaper to reach a small number of 
                                              
12 But this benefit to shareholders may only be temporary. Since creditors are assumed to understand the 
incentives facing shareholders and are aware of the risks involved when loans are negotiated, ultimately the 
owner will bear the consequences of the agency problem in terms of a higher cost of debt.  
13 If collaboration is ruled out, institutions are likely to be in a "prisoners dilemma" situation in respect of 
corporate governance, with each finding acting in their own interests (e.g. selling the shares in an 
underperforming company) leads to a worse outcome than could be realised by acting collectively (e.g. by 
requiring improvements to management structure and performance). 
14 Note that the argument presented here from an institutional investors point of view generalises to the 
extent that any large shareholder, be it an individual, bank or company, may exert direct influence on a firm and 
thereby overcome corporate governance problems. A number of studies showing effective exercise of 
governance in Germany, Japan and the US are noted in Schleifer and Vishny (1997). 
15 Note that in countries such as Italy, direct control via equity is exerted in pyramidical groups of 
companies, where those (larger firms) higher up hold shares in those (smaller) lower down (OECD 1995). 
16 This is an important observation, since it is often suggested in countries such as the UK that the longer 
term relationships, close monitoring of company performance and large shareholdings needed for alternatives to 
take-over to operate will not be present in the case of indexation. 
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well-informed key investors who will command a majority of votes (note however that such coalition 
building is essential for effective institutional control to be exerted, as either by law or by strategy of 
diversification, institutions do not seek to hold large stakes in firms). 
 
In the US, the change in attitude was crystallised by two events, first a 1988 ruling by the US 
Department of Labour (the Avon letter) that decisions on voting by pension funds were fiduciary acts 
of plan asset management under ERISA17, which must be performed either directly by trustees or 
delegated wholly to external managers. Note however that despite their growing importance there is no 
equivalent to this for mutual funds. Second, there are shareholder initiatives on social issues (South 
Africa, the environment) in the late 1980s, which stimulated increased interest by public pension funds 
in the importance of proxy issues generally.  The collapse of the take -over wave itself at the turn of the 
decade18 helped to boost activism, by removing an alternative means of corporate control. Under the 
recently enacted "lead plaintiff" provision of the US Private Securities Litigation Act of 1995, large 
shareholders can seek to be named controlling parties on class-action shareholder lawsuits against 
company management. 
 
Since these developments, US funds have consistently voted on resolutions they might previously have 
ignored.  Public funds such as the California Public Employees' (CALPERS) and New York 
Employees' (NYEPF) have been particularly active, notably in seeking to challenge excessive 
executive compensation and take-over protections, in seeking to split the roles of chairman and chief 
executive, remove under-performing chief executives19, ensure independent directors are elected to 
boards20, and that new directors be appointed by non-executives.  These ends are reached by filing 
proxy resolutions and directing comments and demands to managers, either privately or via the press. 
Private pension fund trustees have been more restrained, perhaps due to the threat of retaliation on the 
parent firm (reflecting in turn the leverage that plan sponsors have over plan trustees). 
 
The effectiveness of such shareholder activism remains a question of lively debate in the US; the bulk 
of empirical work seems to justify scepticism. Wahal (1994) surveyed activism by 9 public pension 
funds over the 1987-93 period and concluded that there was no evidence of improvement in the long 
term stock price performance of targeted firms, which rather continued to decline for three years after 
                                              
17 The US shareholder activist movement was further encouraged in the early 1990s by two new rules from 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the US securities regulator.  The first helped provide information;  
it enforced comprehensive disclosure of executive pay pract ices (salary, bonuses and other perks for the top five 
officers over a three year period) as well as policy regarding their relation to performance of the company as a 
whole, and details of share price performance over five years relative to the index and a peer group.  The second 
enabled investors to collude more readily; now any number of shareholders can communicate orally without 
restriction, so long as they are not seeking to cast votes for others. 
18 This was attributable to such factors as recession, which made target companies less attractive to 
bidders and the retrenchment of banks from take -over finance, following their losses on property, as well as the 
anti-take-over strategies noted above. 
19 Examples in the early 1990s include those of IBM, Westinghouse, Kodak, Amex and General Motors. 
20 Celebrated cases include the CALPERS agreement to back Texaco management in a take -over bid, if they 
agreed to support independent directors, and CALPERS and the NYEPF pressure on General Motors to accept a 
resolu tion for more than half the directors to be independent. 
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targeting. Gillan and Starks (1995) found some positive returns in the short term but no statistically 
significant positive returns over the long term, leading them to question the overall effectiveness of 
shareholder activism. Smith (1996), looking at the firm which had been targeted by CALPERS, found 
that activism again led to no statistically significant increase in performance of the companies 
concerned, although activism had led to changes in that 72% of targets had adopted proposed 
governance structure resolutions or made changes sufficient to warrant a settlement. Moreover, there 
was a statistically significant increase in shareholder wealth; CALPERS gained an estimated $19 
million over 1989-1993 at a cost to itself of $3.5 million. Karpoff et al (1996) found that shareholder 
initiatives were well targeted on firms with atypically poor prior performance, but had little effect on 
operating returns, company share values and top management turnover; the only exception was a 
significant improvement in returns on assets for the targets relative to a control group. 
 
On the other hand Wahal (1996), in a sample of 43 cases, found efforts by institutions to promote 
organisational change via negotiation with management (as opposed to proxy proposals) are associated 
with gains in share prices. Strickland et al (1996) report that firms targeted for pressure by the United 
Shareholders Association (admittedly comprising mainly small investors) and which negotiated 
settlement with the group experienced positive abnormal stock returns, but corporate governance 
proposals per se had no effect. 
 
Monks (1997) suggests that such results may reflect the fact that while public pension funds are well 
placed to raise "fairness" issues, the incentive structure of trustees is not such as to encourage the long 
term pressure on management needed to obtain positive excess returns in the long term. More 
effective institutional pressure may be exerted by so-called relationship investors such as Warren 
Buffett and the LENS fund; aided by backgrounds in business, commitment and unwillingness to be 
distracted. But as noted by Monks (1997), working together with public funds is at times fruitful. 
 
Broadly similar tendencies towards shareholder activism are apparent in other Anglo-Saxon countries 
such as the UK and Canada - often aided by US involvement.  In the UK, pressure from shareholders 
(and the Bank of England) led to formation of the so-called Cadbury Committee on corporate 
governance, which set a code of good practice.  Its key recommendations include separation of chief 
executive and chairman, appointment of a minimum of three independent non-executive directors, 
disclosure of directors pay and that directors' appointments be only for three years.  The National 
Association of Pension Funds has orchestrated pressure on managers to accept the Cadbury guide-
lines, although it opposes compulsory voting by institutional shareholders. More recently, institutional 
investors have been active in opposing lax and overlong executive contracts, pensions and share 
options, which were not covered in detail by the Cadbury guide-lines. The guidelines were developed 
further in the recent Greenbury report. As examples of activism, there is the dismissal of Maurice 
Saatchi from his eponymous advertising firm, spearheaded also by US institutions.  
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In Canada, (Simon (1993)) activism has been encouraged by the US example, but also by poor 
performance of Canadian firms, and the scope for such pressure offered by the loosening grip of 
foreign multinationals and family owners.  For example, in 1993 OMERS (The Ontario Municipal 
Employee Retirement System) one of the largest Canadian pension funds, published a list of proxy 
voting guide-lines, covering executive stock options, LBOs, unequal voting shares and environmental 
practices.  Successes of shareholder activism include concessions by companies to allow secret voting, 
boosting the numbers of non-executive directors and better disclosure. 
 
An additional factor of major interest, which has been little researched, is the role of governance of the 
institutional investor itself in the context of the activism it carries out. It is well known in the US that 
public funds are the most active. O'Barr and Conley (1992) suggest that such activism relates partly to 
the size of the funds, which makes selling shares in poor performers potentially expensive, and 
indexation (which is more common in public than private funds).  But also by being active on 
shareholder rights, public pension fund managers can pre-empt the pressure from politicians to use 
funds for social ends;  and as public figures themselves, managers of public funds reap benefits from 
activism in terms of publicity. Private funds have been much less active, and generally support 
incumbent management.  Whereas reasons put forward include lack of knowledge of other companies' 
business, O'Barr and Conley (1992), concluded that there was an underlying desire not to trouble other 
firms lest their pension fund retaliate, and thus cause difficulties for the fund managers vis a vis the 
sponsor's management.  They would also see dangers of conflicts of interest if they become too heavily 
involved in running businesses. 
 
Other types of institution whose incentives are less clear include bank controlled mutual funds - a key 
form of institution in Europe. It is to European experience and prospects that we now turn. 
 
4 Corporate governance in Continental Europe: a revolution in corporate financing? 
 
As noted, countries such as Germany, Japan and, to a lesser extent, France are often characterised as 
"bank dominated", with close relations between banks and firms based on sharing of information 
unavailable to other investors, a preponderance of bank lending in corporate finance and relatively 
underdeveloped securities markets (see Edwards and Fischer (1991), Davis (1993)). This is often seen 
as an advantage, giving scope for firms to obtain long term debt finance for investment and R&D, and 
for banks to mount rescues of firms in difficulty. Bisignano (1991) has pinpointed key underlying 
features, such as a low level of public information disclosure by companies, scepticism regarding the 
allocative efficiency of markets, preference for "insider control" and close holding of companies, and a 
maintenance of an informal rather than rule based system for governing financial relations.  
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Even in the bank-dominated countries such as Germany and Japan, US pension funds have introduced 
shareholder activism21, and often encouraged domestic shareholders to be more willing to stand up to 
the status quo. Many firms in Continental Europe are already seeking access to international equity 
finance, and are accordingly being obliged to meet the needs for better accounting (based on the US 
GAAP) and hence more transparency, dividend payment etc. of Anglo-Saxon pension funds (Schulz 
(1993)). German firms have since 1985 raised DM 200 bn., more than double the amount of equity 
raised in 1950-85, inflation adjusted, thus increasing the scope of institutionalisation. 
 
French domestic shareholders have been active in a number of cases such as Suez and Navigation 
Mixte. It is notable that European countries are developing their regulations in this area, for example a 
French law to protect minority shareholders in take -overs, under pressure from institutions. Other 
provisions that institutions press for are insider information restrictions (recently introduced in 
Germany), limits on dual classes of share (an important issue in Switzerland) and equal treatment of 
creditors in bankruptcy (to protect corporate bond holdings).  
 
The scope of such convergence to date should not be exaggerated (Berglöf 1996), not least because of 
the large proportion of corporate firms which are private in Continental Europe and Japan. 
Nevertheless, growth of domestic institutions free and willing to invest in equity seems likely given 
pressure on social security pension systems. Complementing existing pressures from international 
institutions outlined above, growth of such domestic institutions, a class of institutions unlikely to be 
willing to be subordinate to banks, could in the opinion of the author (Davis (1993)) overturn the system 
and lead to convergence on the "Anglo -Saxon" model. Introduction of pension funds in Italy in the 
wake of social security reform (OECD 1995) - a country which Schleifer and Vishny (1997) highlight 
as having particularly poor legal protection for shareholders - may be a forerunner of changes 
elsewhere 
 
The effect on corporate finance, for example, could be profound. Rather than the case at present, 
where equity holders are seen as co-equal partners with creditors and other stakeholders, there would 
be moves towards absolute primacy to equity holders, as ultimate owners of the firm. This could imply, 
for example, pressure on firms for higher and more sustained dividend payments; greater provision of 
information by firms; removal of underperforming managers; equal voting rights for all shares; pre-
emption rights22; and equal treatment in takeovers. To back up these requirements, pension funds 
would demand laws and regulations such as take -over codes, insider information restrictions and limits 
on dual classes of shares, which seek to protect minority shareholders, as well as equal treatment of 
creditors in bankruptcy, to protect their holdings of corporate bonds. Shifts of corporate financing to 
securities markets would be reinforced by structural changes as outlined above, which will deprive 
banks of their comparative advantage in lending arising from superior information and ability to control 
                                              
21 Monks (1997) comments that greater activism of even private US funds abroad may show a lesser fear of 
commercial reprisal. 
22 That is, the right of existing shareholders to first refusal on a new is sue of shares, to prevent dilution of 
their holdings.  
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firms. Partly due to free rider problems23, securities market development would have the side effect of 
reducing banks' willingness to "rescue" firms in difficulty. Companies would need to reduce their 
gearing in response to this; a move that would be facilitated by the increased demand for equities from 
institutions24. 
 
Some such patterns are already discernible; flotations in countries such as Germany are at a record 
level25 and on the side of universal banks, there are clear tendencies already to switch from traditional 
lending to investment banking activities and decumulation of shareholdings. Note also that on the side of 
companies, research suggests that there is a preference for reducing dependence on "relationship 
banks", to avoid the risk of exploitation (see Edwards and Fischer (1994), Hoshi et al (1993)), which is 
facilitated by the growth of securities markets, and takes place even though the result is a greater 
vulnerability to financial distress (Hoshi et al (1991), Elston (1993)). As noted by Hellwig (1991), this 
may link to desire to avoid exploitation in the context of an exclusive relationship. In addition, as argued 
by Petersen and Rajan (1993) so-called “commitment” relations may be vulnerable to increased 
banking competition, due to risk of poaching of borrowers by other lenders. Empirically, Gorton and 
Schmid (1996), attribute a disappearance of the favourable effects of German bank equity holding on 
firm performance between 1974 and 1985 to disintermediation, reductions in equity holdings by banks 
and greater interbank competition. All of these were thought to weaken banks' oversight over 
management. 26  
 
But radical change will take time. For example, company statutes in countries would need to be 
reformed if stakeholders were no longer to have a say in management. And company secrecy is to 
some degree protected by law, thus maintaining banks' comparative advantage over markets as a 
source of finance. Large blocks of shareholding, by banks, families or other firms, will disperse at most 
only gradually. The example of the Netherlands, where pension funds do not have a strong voice in 
corporate governance, show that pension fund growth alone is not sufficient to ensure radical change in 
                                              
23 Because equity and bond holders would benefit from banks' actions.  
24 On the other hand, the position of banks will to some extent be protected by shareholding structures, 
which give them both stakes a nd voting rights on behalf of custodial holders. Medium sized firms may prefer to 
avoid flotation to retain "insider control". Company statutes in countries such as Germany recognise the rights of 
stakeholders, including creditors, to a say in management. And company secrecy is to some degree protected by 
law, thus maintaining banks' comparative advantage over markets as a source of finance. Even if there is a broader 
switch to an Anglo-Saxon system, the banks could maintain control via dominance of securit ies issuance and 
fund management. And control over fund management could be used to avoid some of the changes in financial 
structure outlined above. However, in our view this is unlikely, given the Single Market and the superior 
performance of competitors from the UK and US. On balance, the position of European banks would be weakened 
by institutional growth, but not wholly compromised. 
25  As noted in Bowley (1998), establishment of the so-called Neuer Markt for small firms in Germany has 
facilitated flotation of small firms, albeit with the household sector and foreigners being a more prominent investor 
than domestic institutional investors. There has also been growth of venture capital, driven mainly by 
“adventurous foreign investors”. Interestingly, the article also suggests that “the Neuer Markt and the flows of 
venture capital are breaking down traditional relationships between companies and banks….moving closer to the 
Anglo -Saxon model in which growth is financed through equity…allowing new industries t o flourish where under 
the old system they may have struggled to get off the ground”. 
26 Blockholding per se was still found to be an important favourable influence on company performance.  
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this area (Bolt and Peeters (1998), Hoogduin and Huisman (1998)) – although Dutch pension funds do 
apparently monitor their own debt exposures rather than delegating the task to banks.  
 
EMU may compound these effects. Regarding corporate finance and governance, owing to EMU, 
institutional investors are seeking to diversify much more widely across the Union, and seek to ensure 
that corporate management perform in line with “shareholder value”, be it via development of hostile 
take-overs or direct shareholder pressure. For restructuring, as well as to ensure robustness against 
shocks in a context of weaker bank relationships, companies will wish to issue equity, which implies a 
need to satisfy the expectations of institutional investors regarding dividends, information disclosure, 
minority protection and profitability. And indeed, in the wake of EMU, hostile takeovers have been 
undertaken or attempted in France and Italy; in Europe as a whole mergers and acquisitions were at a 
peak of 3000 in 1998. Development of a euro corporate bond market (Cooper 1998) helps to underpin a 
shift in modes of corporate governance by facilitating leveraged buyouts and take -overs as a means to 
discipline management. For example, Olivetti were able to issue euro 9.4 billion in bonds to finance its 
majority control of Telecom Italia. Companies, under pressure to maximise profits and also facing 
attractive prices in the context of pressures for institutions to diversify across the euro area, are 
divesting their cross-holdings thus eliminating a proportion of currently passive shareholders. Banks 
equally are seeking to further reduce equity holdings, partly owing to capital adequacy considerations.  
 
Following EMU, banks seem likely to be less willing to mount rescues of firms in distress, or even 
lending to cushion needs to restructure. This is because owing to the risk of disintermediation as well as 
greater competition among banks they could not be certain to recoup their investment via higher lending 
spreads on the firm in question27. As noted in Luce (1999) it is not just takeovers that are being 
financed in the euro bond market but also firms are using bonds for the main source of their regular 
debt financing. This pattern again increases the need for equity issuance as well as potential incidence 
of bankruptcy. Among the most interesting outworkings of a shift in corporate governance will be in the 
governance of banks per se, which Dermine (1996) sees shifting from “market share based to value 
based” strategies in the EMU context.  
 
There will be a need for adequate adaptation of information to creditors and investors. Whereas banks 
rely on private information derived e.g. from ongoing credit relations, knowledge of the borrowers 
deposit history28 and use of transactions services, securities markets must rely on public information. In 
IMF (1997) it is argued that EMU will lower public information costs owing to the integration of 
markets for goods and services across the Union. This is because in such a situation there will be less 
need for detailed knowledge of local market conditions; sectoral specialisation by equity or credit 
analysts across the Union would be sufficient for pricing of equity and debt claims.  
 
                                              
27 See Edwards and Fischer (1994). 
28  Note that disintermediation may disturb these information sources. 
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If one accepts the above arguments, then during a transition to a more Anglo-Saxon financial system, 
there is the issue of whether alternative means of corporate control (hostile take -overs and direct 
influence by institutional investors) as well as means of reducing asymmetric information and aiding 
control by debt holders (rating agencies, changes in credit structure and possibly a lower debt/equity 
ratio) can rapidly develop. Otherwise, there could tend to be a "vacuum" in corporate governance and 
corporate finance, with possible misallocation of investment, heightened agency costs and increased 
credit rationing.  
 
Some results in the literature underline the potential importance of this issue. The risk that fragmented 
shareholders will all "free ride" and hence corporate governance will be inadequate is a standard 
critique of capital market based financial systems (Grossman and Hart 1980). There may be similar 
free riding in bond markets which discourage monitoring owing to the public good features of 
information about the borrower (Diamond 1984). Equally, there is concern that initial lenders will be 
less careful regarding monitoring and credit risk in the case of loan packaging, while investors in such 
securities may be less able than banks to deal with rescheduling problems (Hellwig 1991), and 
syndicated loans may suffer from the interest of lead managers in their fees and their low exposure to 
credit risk (thus indicating difficulties for corporate finance). Again, US experience shows that bond 
markets generally find rescheduling after financial distress difficult, and banks generally play a major 
role in restructuring, acting in many ways like German or Japanese relationship banks (Gilson et al 
1990). 
 
Policy action could be considered in this respect, notably in terms of appropriate regulations to buttress 
shareholders' rights, although market forces (e.g. in terms of the requirements that institutions make 
before accepting equity issues) should also be an effective catalyst for change.  
 
Conclusions  
 
The growing dominance of equity holdings by institutional investors, both domestic and international, is 
casting a sharp focus on their activities and owners and monitors of firms. It has been suggested that 
whereas some general considerations arise in all cases, it is useful to separate discussion of the 
developments in the Anglo Saxon countries and continental Europe/Japan. The former is showing an 
increase in direct influence of institutions in place of the previous reliance on the takeover mechanism 
to discipline managers. This has arguably led to improved corporate performance. The latter remain 
more firmly in the bank-relationship based governance paradigm. On the other hand, such differences 
should not be exaggerated, and come convergence is discernible on a modified form of the Anglo 
Saxon paradigm where institutions are the primary actors in corporate governance generally. In 
Europe, EMU will provide a major spur to such convergence. 
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Table 1: Aspects of financial structure 1997 (1980) 
 Size indicator 
(total financial 
assets/GDP) 
Financial 
intermediation 
ratio 
Of which: 
Bank 
intermediation 
Of which: 
Institutional 
intermediation 
Germany 6.1 (3.6) 47 (45) 75 (86) 22 (12) 
France 10.0 (4.8) 35 (62) 73 (68) 27 (4) 
Italy 5.3 (3.9) 32 (32) 91 (98) 9 (5) 
United Kingdom 11.4 (4.2) 42 (34) 42 (64) 38 (26) 
     
Canada 7.1 (5.1) 41 (34) 46 (55) 33 (19) 
Japan 8.5 (5.1) 45 (42) 34 (36) 19 (10) 
United States  7.7 (4.1) 38 (37) 26 (58) 52 (31) 
Source: National balance-sheet data 
 
Table 2: Financial instruments as a proportion of the total, 1997 (1980) 
 Equities Bonds Deposits Loans  
Germany 15 (8) 22 (12) 28 (37) 35 (43) 
France 40 (15) 9 (5) 20 (36) 26 (43) 
Italy 23 (17) 26 (11) 21 (33) 26 (33) 
United Kingdom 40 (24) 9 (16)  28 (35) 18 (24) 
     
Canada 25 (22) 25 (19) 21 (27) 24 (28) 
Japan 10 (10) 17 (16) 36 (35) 35 (38) 
United States  33 (19) 29 (23) 11 (22) 24 (33) 
Source: National balance-sheet data 
 
Table 3: Household sector assets 1997 (1980) 
 Equities Bonds Deposits Institutional 
investment 
Germany 8 (4) 14 (12) 40 (59) 30 (17) 
France 32 (12) 3 (9) 31 (59) 29 (9) 
Italy 25 (10) 22 (8)  23 (58) 10 (6) 
United Kingdom 20 (12) 1 (7) 21 (43) 53 (30) 
     
Canada 28 (24) 5 (8) 30 (38) 32 (21) 
Japan 5 (7) 3 (9) 62 (69) 31 (13) 
United States  24 (21) 7 (10)  14 (33) 47 (28) 
Source: National balance-sheet data 
 
Table 4: Corporate sector liabilities, 1997 (1980) 
 Equities Bonds Loans  
Germany 32 (20) 2 (2) 46 (52)  
France 72 (34) 4 (4) 23 (60)  
Italy 53 (52) 1 (4) 38 (43)  
United Kingdom 69 (37) 1 (2) 11 (22)  
     
Canada 37 (41) 17 (8) 17 (22)  
Japan 20 (22) 7 (3) 45 (45)  
United States  58 (49) 13 (17) 12 (13)  
Source: National balance-sheet data 
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Table 5: Results of correlation analysis 
(fixed effects regressions; variables significant at 95% level)  
Dependent variable Independent variable(1) G-7 Coun-
tries 
Anglo-
Saxon 
Contin-
ental 
Europe and 
Japan 
Size indicator Institutional assets/total 
financial assets  
47.9 (9.1) 42.5 (5.6) 54.3 (7.5) 
Equity/total financial assets  Institutional assets/total 
financial assets  
0.8 (2.8)  1.28 (3.2) 
Volatility of share prices 
(monthly s.d.) 
Institutional assets/total 
financial assets  
 -35.2 (3.7)  
Household equity/ household 
financial assets  
Household institutional 
assets/household financial 
assets  
 -0.4 (3.4)  
Household bonds/ household 
financial assets  
Household institutional 
assets/household financial 
assets  
-0.13 (2.0) -0.24 (3.8)  
Household deposits/ household  
financial assets  
Household institutional 
assets/household financial 
assets  
-0.63 (4.4) -0.45 (4.0) -0.9 (3.4) 
Corporate equity/corporate 
liabilities  
Institutional assets/total 
financial assets  
1.8 (3.4) 1.1 (1.9) 2.6 (3.2) 
Corporate bonds and market 
paper/corporate liabilities  
Institutional assets/total 
financial assets  
  0.35 (1.8) 
Corporate loans/corporate 
liabilities  
Institutional assets/total 
financial assets  
-1.4 (2.9) -0.56 (2.0) -2.3 (2.8) 
 
